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(decided June 28, 1999)
Plaintiffs brought a suit against the State of New York claiming
that the Commuter Tax, under Chapter Five of the Law of 1999,
was unconstitutional.2 The plaintiffs argued that subjecting only
non-residents of New York State to the Commuter Tax was a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of both the United States'
and New York State Constitutions.4 The Supreme Court for New
York County held that the Commuter Tax violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the New
York State Constitution because the tax created an arbitrary
classification based on residency without justifying the distinction
1 182 Misc. 2d 298, 696 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Sup. Ct. New York County June 28,
1999). Five actions pending before the Supreme Court of New York County are
consolidated in the court's opinion. The plaintiffs in this matter are all
"nonresidents of New York State." Id. See also infra note 14 and
accompanying text.
2 Igoe, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 363. Plaintiffs have alleged violations of the Privilege
and Immunities Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. In addition, the plaintiffs
argued that the Commuter Tax similarly violated the Equal Protection Clause,
Commerce Clause and Home Rule Provision of the New York State
Constitution. Please note that this purview examines only the portion of the
court's opinion discussing the plaintiffs' equal protection claim.
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States ... nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
4 N.Y. CoNsT. art. 1 § 11. This section provides:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of
this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because
of race, color, creed or religion be subjected to any
discrimination in his civil rights by any other person or by
firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency
or subdivision of the state.
Id.
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to a rational basis standard.' The court concluded that reducing the
tax burden on New York State residents, simply because of their
residency status, did not rationally relate to a legitimate
government purpose, thereby violating the Equal Protection
Clause.6
In 1999, the City of New York (hereinafter "the City") passed a
local law that imposed a tax on the earnings of "nonresidents" of
the City.7 Subsequently, the Commuter Tax was amended.' The
effect of the amendment subjected an earnings tax only upon out-
of-state individuals who commuted to New York City for their
employment, whereas New York State residents who worked in the
City were exempt.9 The plaintiffs argued that this classification
was arbitrarily based on their status as out-of-state residents and
therefore denied them equal protection of the law under the United
States and New York Constitutions. °
In addressing the issue, the court began its analysis by stating
that although the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution protects individuals from discrimination based on
invidious classifications, the standard imposed by the court is
relaxed when economic statutes are challenged." Furthermore, the
I Igoe, 696 N.Y.S. at 364. "Classifications of taxpayers based on factors other
than race, national origin, or gender must be rationally related to a legitimate
government interest in order to survive constitutional scrutiny." Id.
6 Id.
' Id. at 358. "Nonresidents" included those who traveled to the City for
employment, but resided outside its boundaries.
8 Id. The Commuter Tax was amended by Chapter 5 of the Laws of 1999, which
Governor Pataki signed into law on May 27, 1999. The amendment repealed the
part of the tax that imposed the tax on the earnings of New York State residents.
The term "nonresident individual" was redefined to include individuals who are
not residents of New York State. Id.
9 1d.
10 Id.
" Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547
(1997). In this decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the
prohibition against lobbying in 501 (c)(3) did not violate the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment, even though veterans' organizations were
allowed to lobby and still qualified to receive tax deductible contributions. The
Court stated that a taxpayer not subsidizing the lobbying of tax exempt charities
was a rationally based government purpose. Legislatures have traditionally been
[Vol 16
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court noted that for a classification to survive constitutional
scrutiny, the classification "must be related to a legitimate
government interest.""2
The court initially relied upon Williams v. Vermont. 13  In
Williams, the appellant argued that a Vermont automobile tax
which exempted cars purchased by Vermont residents in other
states, but did not extend an equivalent exemption for automobiles
bought outside of Vermont's boundaries before a person moved
into the state, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution. 4 Under the statute, the credit was only
available if the resident was a Vermont resident at the time of
payment of the sales tax." Williams claimed that creating a
classification for tax purposes based on an individual's residency
was discriminatory.1 6 The United States Supreme Court reasoned
that states could not create classifications unless the distinction
was rationally related to a legitimate government purpose."
Consequently, the Court concluded that favoring residents over
non-residents for the purposes of taxation did not serve such a
purpose.' In sum, the statute did not survive an equal protection
challenge because its end result was not rationally related to its
means.
19
New York's State Courts apply the rational basis standard when
a statute is subject to an equal protection challenge.2° In reaching
awarded broad discretion in creating classifications in the field of taxation
because those statutes are used to fund local needs. Id.
12 Igoe, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
13 472 U.S. 14 (1985).
14 Id.
1I5 d.
16 Id. at 27.
7 Id. at 23. The Court held that there was no rational interest served by making
a distinction between in-state registrants and out-of-state registrants who bring
their cars into Vermont.
,8 Id. at 27.
19 Id. at 23. See also Whyy v. Borough of Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117 (1968)
(holding that a state cannot deny equal protection of the law to a corporation,
solely because of the corporation's foreign status).
20 Igoe, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
2000
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its conclusion, this court relied upon Foss v. City of Rochester.2' In
Foss, the owner of a four-family dwelling in the City of Rochester
claimed that he was denied equal protection of the laws because,
under an amended statute, non-homestead property was taxed at a
higher rate than homestead properties.' Additionally, Foss argued
that his non-homestead property was taxed at a higher rate than
similar non-homestead properties in other parts of the county.1
3
The court held that "there must be a rational reason for deliberately
imposing the demonstrably different tax burdens on similar
properties because of their different geographic locations."'24
Moreover, the Foss court stressed that the creation of different
classifications was permissible so long as the classification was
reasonable and the taxes imposed were uniform within the class.2
If the different classes resulted in invidious discrimination, then the
classification was found discriminatory and subsequently
unconstitutional.26
In Miriam Osborn Memorial Home Ass'n v. Chassin,27 the
appellate court clarified the standard that is applicable to equal
protection challenges. 28 Specifically, the court stated: 1) "there
must be general uniformity of treatment of those similarly
situated;" 2) "the classification for disparity must be reasonable;"
and 3) "the taxes imposed must be uniform within the class."29
Moreover, the court emphasized that while individuals may be
taxed at different rates, all individuals in the separated class must
be treated equally.
30
21 65 N.Y.2d 247,480 N.E.2d 717,491 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1985).
22 Id. at 249, 480 N.E.2d at 719, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 256, 480 N.E.2d at 724, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 133.
2' Id. at 259, 480 N.E.2d at 727, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 136. The court emphasized
the foundation of the taxation system: not all taxpayers are to be treated the
same, but those who are similarly situated must be treated uniformly. Id.
26 65 N.Y.2d at 256,480 N.E.2d at 724,491 N.Y.S.2d at 133.
27 240 A.D.2d 143, 669 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1998).
28 Id.
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Relying on the aforementioned cases, the Supreme Court of New
York held that residency was an arbitrary and irrational reason to
form distinct classifications for tax purposes." The court
emphasized that in-state and out-of-state residents who worked in
the City used similar services during the workday, received the
same benefits from their earnings, and therefore should not be
subjected to an additional tax because of their out-of-state status.32
In the instant case, the purpose of the Commuter Tax was to reduce
the tax burdens on New York State residents, with hopes of
increasing their spending power.33 The court concluded that this
purpose was not rationally related to creating a different
classification based on residency, and therefore held that the statute
was unconstitutional. 34
The Federal and New York State constitutional provisions
guaranteeing equal protection of the law are essentially
analogous.3' Although not similar in language, both clauses
unequivocally prohibit a state from denying equal protection of the
law 6  With regard to economic legislation, both Constitutions
require that a statute have a legitimate legislative purpose and a
rationally related means for achieving its goal. 7 In order to create
a distinct classification within the mandate of the constitution,
those in the group must be treated uniformly. 8 In conclusion, a
statute that created an arbitrary class without simultaneously
fostering a legitimate government interest would be found
unconstitutional under both the United States and New York
Constitutions.
Michele Molfetta




35 Igoe, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 364. See supra notes 3,4 and associated text.
36 See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-332 (1981). "Social and economic
legislation... that does not employ suspect classifications or impinge on
fundamental rights must be upheld against equal protection attacks when the
legislative means are rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Id.
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